000			03291nam a2200433 i 4500
001			CR9789814762366
003			UkCbUP
005			20240905145144.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			190207s2016||||si o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9789814762366 (ebook)
020			_z9789814762359 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
043			_aa-cc--- _aa------ _ae------
050		4	_aHF1604.Z4 _bE8354 2016
082	0	4	_a337.5105 _223
100	1		_aHong, Zhao, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aChina's one belt one road : _ban overview of the debate / _cZhao Hong.
264		1	_aSingapore : _bISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, _c2016.
300			_a1 online resource (33 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aTrends in Southeast Asia ; _v2016 no. 6
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 21 Mar 2019).
520			_aThe debate over China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has been lively and at times heated, both in China and internationally. In many ways, this is a reflection of the vagueness of the concept, and of its exceptionality. OBOR does not prioritize trade and investment concessions, which makes it essentially different from traditional regional economic cooperation models such as FTAs, the TPP and the RCEP. Instead, it emphasizes regional infrastructure connectivity. After China proposed the initiative, countries within the New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially the five Central Asian countries, responded enthusiastically and positively, while Southeast and South Asian countries, on the other hand, expressed more concerns and reservations about the initiative. In response to these countries' concerns, China has tried to adjust its approaches to convince Southeast Asian countries that the OBOR initiative holds potential synergy with ASEAN's development strategies and can play a complementary role in the building of the ASEAN community. Beijing has also adjusted its India strategy. From previously "inviting" India to join OBOR, it is now stressing "strategy connectivity" and "policy coordination" between the two countries. Nevertheless, OBOR is viewed by some as an expression of China's grand ambitions to lead Asian economic growth, and by others as a grand strategy to build a "China-dominated Asia". While it may be mainly an economic and trade initiative, its broader consequences have a strong political and security dimension. Hence, China badly needs to cultivate political trust with neighbouring countries if it wishes to convince them that the initiative is a "public" strategy, and not a "conspiratorial" one.
650		0	_aTrade routes _zEurasia.
651		0	_aChina _xForeign economic relations _zEurasia.
651		0	_aEurasia _xForeign economic relations _zChina.
651		0	_aChina _xCommerce _zEurasia.
651		0	_aEurasia _xCommerce _zChina.
651		0	_aChina _xCommercial policy.
651		0	_aChina _xEconomic policy.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9789814762359
830		0	_aTrends in Southeast Asia _v2016 no. 6.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9789814762366/type/BOOK
942			_2ddc _cEB
999			_c9098 _d9098