000			03164nam a2200445 i 4500
001			CR9781009058254
003			UkCbUP
005			20240910200722.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			210304s2022||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781009058254 (ebook)
020			_z9781316512319 (hardback)
020			_z9781009061025 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
043			_as-ck--- _as-cl---
050	0	0	_aKH501 _b.T54 2022
082	0	0	_a342.8/00269 _223/eng/20220331
100	1		_aTiede, Lydia Brashear, _d1965- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aJudicial vetoes : _bdecision-making on mixed selection constitutional courts / _cLydia Brashear Tiede, University of Houston.
264		1	_aCambridge, United Kingdom ; _aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _c2022.
300			_a1 online resource (xviii, 305 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aComparative constitutional law and policy
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 25 Jul 2022).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- The implications of mixed judicial selection on decision-making -- Mixed judicial selection : prevalence and variation -- The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal in political context -- The Colombian Constitutional Court in political context -- Determinants of legal invalidation by constitutional judges -- Determinants of legal invalidation by constitutional courts -- Weak judicial vetoes and contentious politics -- Conclusion : judicial selection and decision-making.
520			_aHow does the selection of judges influence the work they do in important constitutional courts? Does mixed judicial selection, which allows more players to choose judges, result in a court that is more independent and one that can check powerful executives and legislators? Existing literature on constitutional courts tends to focus on how judicial behaviour is motivated by judges' political preferences. Lydia Brashear Tiede argues for a new approach, showing that, under mixed selection, institutions choose different types of judges who represent different approaches to constitutional adjudication and thus have different propensities for striking down laws. Using empirical evidence from the constitutional courts of Chile and Colombia, this book develops a framework for understanding the factors, external and internal to courts, which lead individual judges, as well as the courts in which they work, to veto a law.
610	1	0	_aChile. _bTribunal Constitucional _xDecision making
610	1	0	_aColombia. _bCorte Constitucional _xDecision making
650		0	_aConstitutional courts _zChile _xDecision making
650		0	_aPolitical questions and judicial power _zChile.
650		0	_aConstitutional courts _zColombia _xDecision making
650		0	_aPolitical questions and judicial power _zColombia.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781316512319
830		0	_aComparative constitutional law and policy.
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009058254
942			_2ddc _cEB
999			_c9017 _d9017