000 03739nam a2200361 i 4500
001 9780197539323
003 UK-OxUP
005 20240216142729.0
006 m|||||o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 220902s2022||||nyu|||||o|||||||||||eng|d
020 _a9780197539323
_qelectronic book
_z9780197539293
_qprint
040 _aUK-OxUP
_beng
_cUK-OxUP
_erda
_epn
050 0 0 _aK140-165
_b356
082 0 _a340
100 1 _aKalman, Laura
_eauthor
245 1 0 _aFDR's Gambit
_bThe Court Packing Fight and the Rise of Legal Liberalism
_helectronic
_cLaura Kalman
250 _aFirst Edition
264 1 _aNew York, NY
_bOxford University Press
_c2022
300 _a438 p
_bAll black and white images
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aOxford scholarship online
500 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 _aContents: Preface—Court Packing as History and Memory – Acknowledgments – 1. Roosevelt v. “The Nine Old Men”: March 1933–February 1936 – 2. Victory—and Its Fruits: April 6–December 26, 1936 – 3. Bright Prospects, Bold Opposition: January 1–March 3, 1937 – 4. A Change in Tune at the White House—and at the Court?: March 4–April 11, 1937 – 5. “Talk of Compromise . . . Heard Everywhere”: April 12–May 25, 1937 – 6. “Prestige”: May 18, 1937–November 8, 1938 – 7. Afterlife: 1937–2022 – Afterword—About Those “Later Historians”: Historians, Political Scientists, Law Professors, and “1937” – Abbreviations for Manuscript Sources – Notes – Index
520 3 _aAfter winning the greatest victory ever in 1936, Franklin Roosevelt stunned the country the following year. He proposed adding up to six new justices to the Supreme Court for every justice who reached the age of seventy and did not retire. He did so under the stated guise of assisting elderly justices. His real reason was that they blocked his program. Six of the court’s members were over seventy. Five of the six were conservatives who struck down New Deal legislation, often by razor-thin margins. A firestorm exploded. FDR was accused of “court packing,” dictatorial ambitions, political trickery, undermining the rule of law, and undercutting judicial independence. The overwhelmingly Democratic Senate recommitted his bill by seventy to twenty. The magnitude of his defeat made his remedy seem absurd. And indeed, scholars have portrayed the court bill as the ill-fated brainchild of a hubristic president made overbold by victory. Consequently, in the eighty-five years since, court packing has become unthinkable, and the court’s current size, an entrenched norm. Based on extensive archival research, this book challenges the conventional wisdom by telling the story as it unfolded, without the distortions of hindsight. It argues that acumen, not arrogance, accounted for Roosevelt’s actions. Far from erring tragically from the beginning, he came very close to getting additional justices, and the court itself changed course. In fact, the episode suggests that proposing a change in the court might give the justices reason to consider whether their present course is endangering the institution and its vital role in a liberal democracy. But whether or not it is the right remedy for today’s troubles, court packing does not deserve to be recalled as one fated for failure in 1937.
650 0 0 _aCourt Packing, Court Expansion
650 0 0 _xFDR v. Congress FDR v. Supreme Court
776 0 8 _iPrint Version
_z9780197539293
830 0 _aOxford Academic
856 4 0 _3Oxford Academic
_uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539293.001.0001
999 _c7837
_d7837