000			04209nam a2200601 i 4500
001			9781509936533
003			CaBNVSL
005			20240319163352.0
006			m o d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			201221s2020 enk ob 101 0 eng d
010			_z 2020052057 (print)
019			_a1198018077
020			_a9781509936533 _q(ebook)
020			_z9781509936526 _q(PDF)
020			_z9781509945191 _q(print)
020			_z9781509936502 _q(hardback)
020			_z1509936505 _q(print)
020			_z1509945199 _q(print)
020			_z9781509936519 _q(ePub)
024	7		_a10.5040/9781509936533 _2doi
035			_a(OCoLC)1224584551
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cCaBNVSL _dCaBNVSL
050		4	_aK230.G59 _bA35 2021eb
082	0	0	_a340/.1 _223
100	1		_aGkouvas, Triantafyllos, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aLaw's humility : _benlarging the scope of jurisprudential disagreement / _cby Triantafyllos Gkouvas.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aOxford, UK ; _bHart Publishing, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing, _c2020.
264		2	_a[London, England] : _bBloomsbury Publishing, _c2020
300			_a1 online resource (304 pages).
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aLaw and practical reason ; _vvolume 11
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aFrom legalese to ontologese -- Relating legal propositions to legal facts -- Relating legal facts to legal propositions -- Two levels of disagreement about the metaphysics of law -- Resisting ordinary reasons imperialism -- The metric approach to legal normativity -- Two levels of disagreement about the normativity of law.
506			_aAbstract freely available; full-text restricted to individual document purchasers.
520			_a"This book invites newcomers to analytical legal philosophy to reconsider the terms in which they are accustomed to describing and defending their jurisprudential allegiances. It argues that familiar taxonomic labels such as legal positivism, natural law theory and legal interpretivism are poor guides to the actual diversity of views on the nature and normativity of law, mainly because they fail to carve up the reality of jurisprudential disagreement at its joints. These joints, the author suggests, are elusive because the semantics of law systematically misplaces them. Their true nature resides in the metaontological and metanormative features that dictate or indicate the target of a theory's jurisprudential commitments. The book advocates a new vocabulary for articulating these commitments without eliminating the use of familiar criteria of division among competing theories of law. The resulting picture is a much broader platform of meaningful disagreement about the nature and grounds of legal truth and legal normativity. Albeit based on a factualist-cognitivist understanding of the sources and grounds of law, the book reserves ample room for the unconvinced. Those suspicious of the project of "ontologising" theoretical disagreements in law can avail themselves of the quietist or anti-metaphysical avenue that the book's alternative taxonomy also makes available. The humblest path to law's reality may not be metaphysically ambitious after all"-- _cProvided by publisher.
530			_aAlso published in print.
532	0		_aCompliant with Level AA of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines. Content is displayed as HTML full text which can easily be resized or read with assistive technology, with mark-up that allows screen readers and keyboard-only users to navigate easily
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
650		0	_aLaw _xPhilosophy.
650		0	_aJurisprudence.
650		0	_aLaw _xInterpretation and construction.
650		7	_aJurisprudence & philosophy of law _2bicssc
655		0	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781509945191
830		0	_aLaw and practical reason ; _vvolume 11
856	4	0	_3Abstract with links to full text _uhttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781509936533?locatt=label:secondary_bloomsburyCollections
975			_aHart Publishing 2021
999			_c10690 _d10690