Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Part I. The Reality of Systematic War Preparations, War Mobilization, and Economic Control -- War planning and mobilization during the first-half of the war with China -- Operation plan, war plan, and basic national defense policy -- Part II. Materials-Mobilization Plans, Production-Capacity-Expansion Plans, and Economic Control -- Economic planning and control in wartime Japan : general discussion -- Materials-mobilization plans (MMPlans) -- Production-capacity-expansion plans and policies -- PCE Policies in Manchukuo (Manchuria) -- Part III. The Navy Air Force : Study of a Central Player in the War on the Japanese Side -- Preparations -- The Navy Air Force during the war with China -- The Navy Air Force during the Pacific War -- Conclusion.

Although most economists maintain a mistrust of a government's goals when it intervenes in an economy, many continue to trust its actual ability. They retain, in other words, a faith in state competence. For this faith, they adduce no evidence. Sharing little skepticism about the government's ability, they continue to expect the best of governmental intervention. To study government competence in World War II Japan offers an intriguing laboratory. In this book, Yoshiro Miwa shows that the Japanese government did not conduct requisite planning for the war by any means. It made its choices on an ad hoc basis and the war itself quickly became a dead end. That the government planned for the war incompetently casts doubts on the accounts of Japanese government leadership more generally.